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THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF APPROPRIATIONS
TRANSFER AUTHORITY UNDER THE
NONDELEGATION DOCTRINE
Shelby Begany Telle+
I. INTRODUCTION

Article I, Section 9 of the U.S. Constitution provides the legislative branch
with the power of the purse by granting it the exclusive authority to designate
how federal dollars may be spent via appropriations laws.1 Through the process
of developing appropriations laws, Congress carefully balances competing
interests within a fixed total annual amount set through a separate budget
resolution.2 This topline allocation is rarely enough to meet the aspirational
funding levels requested by the President,3 individual members of Congress, and
their constituencies.4 Therefore, every dollar appropriated represents, at best, an
expression of the values and priorities of the legislative branch and, at worst, a
negotiated settlement between the legislative bodies and the President.
Ultimately, however, any appropriation made by law is an exercise of Article I,
Section 9 power.

J.D. 2019, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law; B.A. 2013,
Vanderbilt University. The author would like to thank her family for their support, Bill Duhnke
for being a sounding board, and the Catholic University Law Review staff and editors for helping
edit this Comment.
1. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7 (stating “[n]o Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but
in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law; and a regular Statement and Account of the
Receipts and Expenditures of all public Money shall be published from time to time”).
2. The topline number for the Fiscal Year 2017 omnibus was $1.163 trillion. Press Release,
The U.S. House of Representatives Comm. on Appropriations, Comprehensive Gov’t Funding Bill
Released
(May
1,
2017),
https://appropriations.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=394859.
3. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-05-734SP, A GLOSSARY OF TERMS USED IN
THE FEDERAL BUDGET PROCESS 1 (2005),
https://www.appropriations.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/glossary-of-terms-used-in-the-federalbudget-process.pdf (stating that “[t]he President’s budget is the Administration’s proposed plan for
managing funds, setting levels of spending, and financing the spending of the federal government.
It is not only the President’s principal policy statement but is also the starting point for
congressional budgetary actions.”) [hereinafter GAO GLOSSARY].
4. See David Reich & Chloe Cho, House Appropriations Bills Fall Far Short of Meeting
National Needs, CENTER ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES 1, 3 (July 26, 2017),
https://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/7-26-17bud.pdf (finding that even after
sequestration created by the Budget Control Act in 2011 ended, non-defense programs still seem
to be taking cuts, with non-defense spending below the Budget Control Act caps).
+

575

576

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 68:575

In fiscal year 2017, the topline section 302(a)5 allocation the Appropriations
Committees could use to address all federal discretionary spending 6 was
approximately $1.07 trillion.7 The Appropriations Committees spread this
funding across twelve separate appropriations subcommittees that recommend
funding for everything from food inspections, to enforcing securities laws, to
providing for national defense.8 Rather than providing funding at the agency
level, the appropriations bills originated by these subcommittees often make
appropriations in a very specific manner, even by individual project. 9
Invariably, when allocating over one trillion dollars annually in such a specific
manner, Congress cannot predict precisely the future, which results in
overfunding some initiatives and underfunding others.10
To rectify these deviations, Congress almost always includes transfer
authority, which provides executive branch recipients of appropriations the
ability to shift “all or part of the budget authority in one appropriation or fund
account to another.”11 Some appropriations bills set a threshold on the amounts
5. Section 302(a) allocations come from section 302(a) of the Congressional Budget and
Impoundment Control Act of 1974 and represent the total limit that the Appropriations Committee
has to appropriate in a given fiscal year. Section 302(b) allocations, on the other hand, are the
amounts divided up among the subcommittees by the full Appropriations Committees. GAO
GLOSSARY, supra note 3, at 32–33, 92.
6. ‘“ Discretionary appropriation’ refers to those budgetary resources that are provided in
appropriation acts, other than those that fund mandatory programs,” which funds entitlement
programs such as social security. Id. at 46.
7. 2 U.S.C. § 901(c)(4) (2012) ($1.07 trillion does not take into account disaster funding or
overseas contingency operations funding). Press Release, supra note 2.
8. See generally Subcommittees, U.S. SENATE COMM. ON APPROPRIATIONS,
https://www.appropriations.senate.gov/subcommittees (last visited Mar. 18, 2018) (highlighting
that there are 12 subcommittees within the overall appropriations committees).
9. See generally Committee Jurisdiction, U.S. SENATE COMM. ON APPROPRIATIONS,
https://www.appropriations.senate.gov/about/jurisdiction (last visited Mar. 18, 2018).
10. Sometimes a supplemental appropriation is required when there is an otherwise
unforeseen situation, such as a natural disaster, that requires funding not contemplated during the
regular appropriations process.
U.S. SENATE, GLOSSARY, Supplemental Appropriation,
https://www.senate.gov/reference/glossary_term/supplemental_appropriation.htm.
11. GAO GLOSSARY, supra note 3, at 95. Many people mistakenly use “transfer” and
“reprogramming” interchangeably. For clarification, a “reprogramming” is
[s]hifting funds within an appropriation or fund account to use them for purposes other
than those contemplated at the time of appropriation; it is the shifting of funds from one
object class to another within an appropriation or from one program activity to another.
While a transfer of funds involves shifting funds from one account to another,
reprogramming involves shifting funds within an account . . . . Generally agencies may
shift funds within an appropriation or fund account as part of their duty to manage their
funds. Unlike transfers, agencies may reprogram without additional statutory authority.
Nevertheless, reprogramming often involves some form of notification to the
congressional appropriations committees, authorizing committees, or both. Sometimes
committee oversight of reprogramming actions is prescribed by statute and requires
formal notification of one or more committees before a reprogramming action may be
implemented.
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that can be transferred between appropriations, while others require notification
to the Appropriations Committees prior to the transfer, and still others require
that the Appropriations Committees “approve” the transfer.12 In essence,
transfer authority allows the executive branch to elect (within certain
parameters) to move money between accounts without a prior or subsequent law
revising the appropriated dollar amounts. Allowing an agency to transfer funds
from one non-specific appropriation to another, however, is arguably an
abdication of portions of the legislature’s exclusive power over the purse
strings.13
As the national debt continues to grow and the partisan rancor in Congress
becomes more pronounced,14 it has become increasingly difficult for Congress
and the executive branch to reach consensus on appropriations bills, which must
pass to keep the government operating.15 Ironically, the demise of congressional
earmarking, a process by which appropriations law directed federal funds to very
specific projects at the request of individual members of Congress, and which
has been banned in the name of reducing wasteful spending, has only made
compromise more elusive.16 In the absence of legislative concurrence with an
executive branch priority, the executive branch could utilize transfer authority
from multiple individual appropriations to pool money to fund activities that
Congress lacked the ability or consensus to fund. Such maneuvers, enabled by
the transfer authority granted by Congress in legislation, may represent a direct
interference with Congress’s exclusive Article I, Section 9 authority, as the new
spending is not in line with an appropriation “in [c]onsequence of . . . law.”17
This Comment will examine the constitutionality of executive transfers of
appropriations via transfer authority. It will ultimately argue that such transfers

Id. at 85.
12. See generally Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2017, Pub. L. No. 115–31, 131 Stat. 135
(2017) (providing appropriations across the federal government for fiscal year 2017).
13. See generally U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7.
14. See BUREAU OF THE FISCAL SERV., The Debt to the Penny and Who Holds It, TREASURY
DIRECT (Nov. 9, 2017), https://www.treasurydirect.gov/NP/debt/current (using Daily History
Search Application, enter “November 9, 2017;” then click Find History) (finding that the national
debt in November of 2017 was more than $20 trillion).
15. See JAMES V. SATURNO & JESSICA TOLLESTRUP, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42647,
CONTINUING RESOLUTIONS: OVERVIEW OF COMPONENTS AND RECENT PRACTICES 10–11 (2016)
(showing that there has been a progressive decrease in the number of regular appropriations bills
passed from 13 in 1977 to zero in 2016).
16. Rollcall Staff, The Congressional Earmark Ban: The Real Bridge to Nowhere, ROLL
CALL
(July
30,
2014,
9:59
AM),
https://www.rollcall.com/news/the_congressional_earmark_ban_the_real_bridge_to_nowhere_co
mmentary-235380-1.html (reporting that a 2005 earmark for construction of a bridge in Alaska
received national attention and led to the reduction of earmarks in 2007 and their end in 2011, yet
debt and dysfunction in Congress has persisted).
17. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7.
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are unconstitutional under the nondelegation doctrine18 and that certain concepts
that might alleviate these nondelegation concerns face further constitutional
issues by running afoul of the Supreme Court’s holding in INS v. Chadha.19
First, this Comment will examine the history and emergence of transfer
authority. Next, it will examine the nondelegation doctrine and apply it to the
appropriations transfer scenario, a scenario not yet addressed in nondelegation
doctrine caselaw. Furthermore, a common means Congress uses to enable
needed flexibility while maintaining control of appropriations after the
enactment of an appropriations law is to require the Appropriations Committees
to preapprove the transfer.20 This Comment will argue that such means are also
unconstitutional due to the holding in INS v. Chadha, which prohibits the
legislative veto.21 Finally, this Comment will analyze what parties might be able
to bring a challenge to the constitutionality of transfer authority and those
parties’ ability to gain standing. In conclusion, this Comment will outline
several solutions or policy goals intended to assist Congress in maintaining the
constitutional integrity of its Article I, Section 9 authority, which is a key
legislative branch responsibility in maintaining the balance of power between
three separate and equal branches of government.
II. THE GROWTH OF PROBLEMATIC TRANSFER AUTHORITY
A. The Rise of Transfer Authority

The inclusion of transfer authority in appropriations bills is a relatively new
phenomenon.22 In the early years of the Republic, transfers of funds from one
appropriation to another was deemed prohibited because “Congress [had] taken
from the department[s] the power to transfer appropriations from one head to
another; and a cardinal rule controlling the application of appropriations is, that
they must be expended on the objects specified.”23 Furthermore, early opinion
18. “The non-delegation doctrine is a principle in administrative law that Congress cannot
delegate its legislative powers to other entities.” Rather, when it instructs agencies to regulate, it
“must give the agencies an ‘intelligible principle’ on which to base their regulations.”
Nondelegation
Doctrine,
CORNELL
L.
SCH.
LEGAL
INFO.
INST.,
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/nondelegation_doctrine (last visited Jan. 28, 2019).
19. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 954–55 (1983) (holding that a one chamber veto is
unconstitutional on the basis that it denies the President the power of presentment).
20. See, e.g., Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2017, Division G § 201.
21. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 at 959.
22. Before the 1950s, “adjustments” and “interchangeability” were used to discuss what is
today known as a “transfer.” MICHELLE D. CHRISTENSEN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43098,
TRANSFER AND REPROGRAMMING OF APPROPRIATIONS: AN OVERVIEW OF AUTHORITIES,
LIMITATIONS, AND PROCEDURES 1, n.5 (2013). Transfers were already established by the mid1940s because the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Act of 1949, which established the CIA,
included transfer authority within the organic statute. Id. at 5.
23. Transfers of Appropriations, 4 Op. Att’y Gen. 428, 428–29 (1845).
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raised concerns that the ability to transfer from one appropriation to another
without explicit legislative direction would “derange the system of
appropriations contemplated by the constitution, and be placing in the hands of
the President, in effect, the appropriating power.”24 Yet, the very “first
appropriations act contained only four payments totaling $639,000 for federal
government operations: $216,000 for the civil list; $137,000 for the War
Department; $190,000 to discharge warrants from the late Board of Treasury;
and $96,000 for pensions for invalid veterans,” and presented a far simpler
landscape than modern practice, which provides hundreds of separate
appropriations by law annually. 25 Thomas Jefferson, however, is said to have

Id.

I have considered the question propounded for my opinion in your letter of the 19th June
last. By the act of 17th June, 1844, an appropriation was made for books, maps, charts,
and instruments, binding and repairing the same, and all the expenses of the
hydrographical office. And you inquire whether a portion of the money thus appropriated
may be legally and properly applied to the erection of a house for the superintendent of
said office. I think not. I presume the officer alluded to is the superintendent of the depot
of charts, and the house to be erected on the grounds connected with that building.
Congress have taken from the department the power to transfer appropriations from one
head to another; and a cardinal rule controlling the application of appropriations is, that
they must be expended on the objects specified. All appropriations for buildings at the
depot of charts have been made specifically for that object; and although such a structure
as that suggested would conduce very materially to the preservation and security of the
valuable public property there stored, it cannot be fairly brought into the category of
expenses of the hydrographical office. These embrace the current annual expenses. My
opinion is, therefore, that the safer course is not to apply this appropriation to such an
object.

24. Transfer of Specific Appropriations of House of Representatives to Contingent Fund, 3
Op. Att’y Gen. 442, 442–43 (1839).
The constitution declares that “no money shall be drawn from the treasury but in
consequence of appropriations made by law,” &c. This I consider as an explicit
inhibition upon the President and all others to draw from the treasury any portion of the
public money, until Congress shall have directed it to be done; and the expression in the
clause of the constitution just quoted, “but in consequence of appropriations made by
law,” clearly indicates that Congress shall also declare the uses to which the money to be
drawn from the treasury is to be applied. The President, therefore, has no power, under
the constitution, over the public treasure, except to apply it in the execution of the laws.
Whenever he so applies it, he acts within his constitutional authority. Whenever he
applies it without the directions of Congress expressed in some legislative act, or against
such directions, he assumes upon himself power not conferred by the constitution. If
Congress has appropriated money for one use or purpose, and has given no express power
or discretion to the President to apply it to another, it seems to me that any act of his,
transferring it to another use or purpose, would be wholly unauthorized by the
constitution. And, surely, no assumption of power could be more dangerous than that of
expending more money upon an object than Congress had appropriated for it.
Id.
25. STAFF OF H.R. COMM. ON APPROPRIATIONS, 111TH CONG., A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE
H.R. COMM. ON APPROPRIATIONS 4 (Comm. Print 2010), https://democrats-
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preferred that appropriations be specific sums for specific activities rather than
lump sums, helping shift the power and control over federal spending more
squarely into the legislative branch’s domain.26
Today, the Appropriations Committees in the Senate and the House of
Representatives are divided into 12 subcommittees that each recommend
funding for numerous departments and agencies, which are each funded through
multiple different appropriations.27 As an example, the Department of Justice
alone receives appropriations through more than 30 separate and distinct
accounts28 and
[e]ach account generally includes similar programs, projects, or items,
such as a research and development account or a salaries and expenses
account, although a few accounts . . . may fund all of the agency’s
activities. These acts typically provide a lump-sum amount for each
account as well as any conditions, provisos, or specific requirements
that apply to that account.29
Generally, agencies may not transfer funds between accounts absent
authorization by law to do so.30 Such authorizations may be found in any manner
of legislation, but they most commonly are found in the text of the appropriations
bills themselves. The fiscal year 2017 omnibus appropriations bill provides
numerous examples of how various subcommittees addressed transfer
authority.31 For example, the Agriculture Appropriations Division prohibited
transfers that would create new programs or eliminate others or drastically
reorganize offices absent written notification and the Committees’ approval. 32
But it appears that within those constraints, transfers under $500,000 or ten
percent of the total value of the account, whichever is less, would be permissible,
assuming such a transfer does not reduce the funding of the donor account by
greater than ten percent.33
appropriations.house.gov/sites/democrats.appropriations.house.gov/files/House_Approps_Concis
e_History.pdf.
26. Id.
27. JAMES V. SATURNO, BILL HENIFF JR. & MEGAN S. LYNCH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
R42388, THE CONGRESSIONAL APPROPRIATIONS PROCESS: AN INTRODUCTION 12 (2016),
https://www.senate.gov/CRSpubs/8013e37d-4a09-46f0-b1e2-c14915d498a6.pdf
(highlighting
that the accounts lump similar programs and functions together).
28. CHRISTENSEN, supra note 22, at 1.
29. SATURNO, HENIFF & LYNCH, supra note 27, at 12. The report language from both the
House and Senate must also be followed. The report language that accompanies the bills often goes
into further detail about how the Committees and Congress intend for funds to be spent or not spent.
Id.
30. Id.
31. See Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2017, Pub. L. No. 115–31, 131 Stat. 135 (2017).
32. Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2017, Division A § 717(a).
33. Id. at § 717(b).
None of the funds provided by this Act, or provided by previous Appropriations Acts to
the agencies funded in this Act that remain available for obligation or expenditure in the
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The Homeland Security Appropriations Division on the other hand, deals with
transfer authority in a slightly different manner. The subcommittee provides
relatively broad transfer authority that does not have many limitations aside from
allowing, upon mere notification to the committees, “up to 5 percent of any
appropriation made available for the current fiscal year for the Department of
Homeland Security” to be transferred so long as the account(s) from which the
funds are being transferred to do not increase by more than ten percent.34
Separately, the Secretary of Homeland Security may transfer up to $20 million
into an emergency account to assist with specific unexpected influxes of
immigrants into the country.35
As a third example of transfer authority, the State and Foreign Operations
Appropriations Division provides that specific accounts, such as the
Broadcasting Board of Governors, may transfer funds or receive transferred
funds.36 Despite some similarities, there is no uniform treatment for transfers
across the government, and agencies must instead look to their specific
appropriations bills and other authorizing language.

Id.

Id.

Id.

current fiscal year, or provided from any accounts in the Treasury derived by the
collection of fees available to the agencies funded by this Act, shall be available for
obligation or expenditure for activities, programs or projects through a reprogramming
or use of the authorities referred to in subsection (a) involving funds in excess of
$500,000 or 10 percent, whichever is less, that—(1) augments existing programs,
projects, or activities; (2) reduces by 10 percent funding for any existing program,
project, or activity, or numbers of personnel by 10 percent as approved by Congress; or
(3) results from any general savings from a reduction in personnel which would result in
a change in existing programs, activities, or projects as approved by Congress; unless the
Secretary of Agriculture or the Secretary of Health and Human Services (as the case may
be) notifies in writing and receives approval from the Committees on Appropriations of
both Houses of Congress at least 30 days in advance of the reprogramming or transfer of
such funds or the use of such authority.
34. Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2017, Division F § 503(b).
Up to 5 percent of any appropriations made available for the current fiscal year for the
Department of Homeland Security by this Act or provided by previous appropriations
Acts may be transferred between such appropriations if the Committees on
Appropriations of the Senate and the House of Representatives are notified at least 30
days in advance of such transfer, but no such appropriation, except as otherwise
specifically provided, shall be increased by more than 10 percent by such transfer.
35. Id. at § 503(e).
36. Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2017, Division J § 7009 (a)(2).
Not to exceed 5 percent of any appropriation made available for the current fiscal year
for the Broadcasting Board of Governors under title I of this Act may be transferred
between, and merged with, such appropriations, but no such appropriation, except as
otherwise specifically provided, shall be increased by more than 10 percent by any such
transfers.
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Such transfer authority is justified functionally by the growing complexity of
the federal bureaucracy and therefore the appropriations process. For example,
“[i]n simpler times, Congress often made appropriations in the form of a single,
consolidated appropriation act. The most recent regular consolidated
appropriation act was [in] . . . 1951.”37 Transfers allow both Congress and the
executive branch to make adjustments and address unplanned situations that may
arise in the middle of a fiscal year.38 Yet, providing for such flexibility and
efficiency may very well be an unconstitutional delegation of Congress’s Article
I, Section 9 powers to the executive branch agencies.
B. A Historical Look at Delegation

The nondelegation doctrine stems from the Constitution itself, in that it vests
“all legislative powers” with Congress under Article I.39 A.L.A. Schechter
Poultry Corp. v. United States,40 is the predominate historical case in studying
the nondelegation doctrine. There, petitioner-defendant Schechter Poultry
Corporation, a New York City slaughterhouse, was convicted of violating the
Live Poultry Code, which was aimed at promoting fair competition within the
poultry industry. According to the government, the defendant violated the
minimum wage requirement, the maximum work hour limitations, and
guidelines on the methodology of selling butchered chicken to retailers. 41 The
defendant argued, in part, that the code was an unconstitutional delegation of
Congress’ legislative authority because the President was charged with enacting
policy to promote the vaguely defined concept of “fair” competition, prompting
the Supreme Court to grant certiorari.42
On the issue of potential improper delegation of power, the Court held that
“Congress is not permitted to abdicate or to transfer to others the essential
legislative functions with which it is thus vested.”43 Congress may still need to
adapt to complex and dynamic situations, and the Constitution does not prohibit
Congress from developing creative ways to do so, but “the wide range of
administrative authority which has been developed . . . cannot be allowed to

37. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., OFF. OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL, GAO-16-464SP,
PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL APPROPRIATIONS LAW, CHAPTER 2: THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK 2–17 (4th
ed. 2016), https://www.gao.gov/assets/680/675709.pdf [hereinafter GAO LEGAL FRAMEWORK].
This report, commonly referred to as the “Red Book” serves as a reference for how GAO’s
Comptroller General issues opinions on questions related to appropriations. Id. at 2-1.
38. CHRISTENSEN, supra note 22, at 1.
39. Viktoria Lovei, Revealing the True Definition of APA § 701(a)(2) by Reconciling “No
Law to Apply” with the Nondelegation Doctrine, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 1047, 1048 (2006) (examining
the nondelegation doctrine through the lens of the Administrative Procedures Act).
40. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
41. Id. at 519–22, 527–28.
42. Id. at 519–21.
43. Id. at 529.
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obscure the limitations of the authority to delegate, if our constitutional system
is to be maintained.”44
In Schechter, the Court considered “fair competition” overbroad as it applied
to the extent of the authorities delegated to the executive branch.45 The Court
held that the President cannot be allowed nearly unfettered authority to develop
law that should be squarely within Congress’ bandwidth and responsibility. 46
As such, the delegation of the code-making authority to regulate the poultry
industry with such nebulous guidance was an unconstitutional delegation of
Congress’s legislative authority. 47
C. Changing the Field with Chadha

Also relevant to the proper exercise of constitutional authority is the Court’s
holding on the use of the legislative veto in INS v. Chadha, in which an alien
immigrant, Chadha, overstayed his visa and was ordered to be deported by the
Immigration and Naturalization Service.48 Chadha filed a petition to suspend
his deportation, and the “[i]mmigration judge . . . ordered that Chadha’s
deportation be suspended . . . [on the basis that] . . . he had resided continuously
in the United States for over seven years, was of good moral character, and
would suffer ‘extreme hardship’ if deported.”49 The attorney general, as then
required by the statute, sent a report to Congress recommending that Chadha
remain in the United States, upon which the House of Representatives voted
against the attorney general’s decision, thus reinstating Chadha’s deportation. 50
Chadha challenged the reinstatement of the deportation, arguing that the ability
for one chamber of Congress to veto the actions of the attorney general was
unconstitutional because it represented a one-house veto, which violated the
separation of powers.51
According to the Chadha Court’s dicta,
the fact that a given law or procedure is efficient, convenient, and
useful in facilitating functions of government, standing alone, will not
save it if it is contrary to the Constitution. Convenience and efficiency
are not the primary objectives—or the hallmarks—of democratic
government and our inquiry is sharpened rather than blunted by the
fact that congressional veto provisions are appearing with increasing
44. Id. at 530.
45. Id. at 531.
46. Id. at 537–38.
47. Id. at 542.
48. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 at 923.
49. Id. at 924. The Immigration and Nationality Act provided specific categories of
immigrants that may be able to suspend their deportation for good behavior over a continuous
period in the United States who would be severely harmed if they were deported. Immigration and
Nationality Act § 244(a)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(c)(1)(A) (repealed 1996).
50. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 924–27.
51. Id. at 928.
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frequency in statutes which delegate authority to executive and
independent agencies.52
The statute in Chadha was found to be unconstitutional on the basis of
denying the President his power of presentment, or the concept that legislation
must be presented to the President for his signature prior to effectuation. 53 The
Court held that “[p]resentment to the President and the Presidential veto were
considered so imperative that the draftsmen took special pains to assure that
these requirements could not be circumvented.”54 Instead, the Court held that:
[T]he Constitutional Convention impose[d] burdens on governmental
processes that often seem clumsy, inefficient, even unworkable, but
those hard choices were consciously made by men who had lived
under a form of government that permitted arbitrary governmental acts
to go unchecked. There is no support in the Constitution or decisions
of [the] Court for the proposition that the cumbersomeness and delays
often encountered in complying with explicit constitutional standards
may be avoided, either by the Congress or by the President.55
III. THE NONDELEGATION DOCTRINE IN AN ERA OF APPROPRIATIONS
TRANSFER AUTHORITY
A. Transfer Authority and the Nondelegation Doctrine

The nondelegation doctrine is well demonstrated by Schechter.56 There, the
Court determined that the use of the phrase “methods of unfair competition” and
the lack of a clear definition of how to apply that principle represented a
delegation of too much authority to the executive branch for which the
legislative branch “is not permitted to abdicate or to transfer to others the
essential legislative functions with which it is thus vested.”57 When “the
discretion of the President in approving or prescribing codes, and thus enacting
laws . . . is virtually unfettered . . . the code-making authority thus conferred is
an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power.”58

52. Id. at 944.
53. Id. at 959.
54. Id. at 946–47.
55. Id. at 959.
56. Schechter, 295 U.S. at 549–51 (holding that A.L.A. Schechter Poultry’s conviction for
violations of the Live Poultry Code should be overturned because Congress had provided too much
authority under the National Industry Recovery to interpret the statute with limited restraints or
guidelines, so Congress had transferred too much of its legislative authority).
57. Id. at 529.
58. Id. at 542.
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1. Nondelegation Challenges May Still Prevail

Some argue that the Court has spoken definitively on delegation, by rejecting
every challenge since Schechter in 1935.59 From that time on, the Court has
looked for merely an “intelligible principle” to determine whether Congress has
provided enough direction to agencies as they implement laws or effectuate
changes.60 According to Mistretta v. United States,61 in “[a]pplying [the]
‘intelligible principle’62 test to congressional delegations, [the] jurisprudence
has been driven by a practical understanding that in our increasingly complex
society, replete with ever changing and more technical problems, Congress
simply cannot do its job absent an ability to delegate power under broad general
directives.”63
While the Court has refrained from finding violations of the nondelegation
doctrine since Schechter in 1935, the remaining embers of the nondelegation
flames continue to glow. Justice Thomas, in his concurrence in Whitman v.
American Trucking Association, suggests that the issue over delegation is not
quite as defunct as recent case law suggests.64 Justice Thomas states that issues
may be
wrangled over constitutional doctrine with barely a nod to the text of
the Constitution. Although [the] Court since 1928 has treated the
“intelligible principle” requirement as the only constitutional limit on
congressional grants of power to administrative agencies, the
Constitution does not speak of “intelligible principles.” Rather, it
speaks in much simpler terms. “All legislative Powers herein granted
shall be vested in a Congress.” I am not convinced that the intelligible
principle doctrine serves to prevent all cessions of legislative power.
I believe that there are cases in which the principle is intelligible and
yet the significance of the delegated decision is simply too great for
the decision to be called anything other than “legislative . . . .” On a
future day . . . I would be willing to address the question whether our
59. Gary Lawson, Delegation and Original Meaning, 88 VA. L. REV. 327, 328 (2002).
60. Id.
61. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 412 (1989) (finding that when Congress
delegates authority to the Sentencing Commission to establish sentencing guidelines for federal
crimes, there is no delegation issue since Congress provided the Sentencing Commission with
guidelines and factors to consider when promulgating sentences).
62. Id. at 372–73. An “intelligible principle” has come to mean any form of guidance that
agencies should operate under as directed by Congress that makes logical sense. See Whitman v.
Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 474–75 (2001).
63. Mistretta, 488 U.S. 361 at 372 (holding that establishing sentencing guidelines is not a
violation of the delegation doctrine and is also not a violation of the separation of powers because
Congress and the statute provided the sentencing commission with an intelligible principle as
guidance).
64. Whitman, 531 U.S. 457, 487 (Thomas, J., concurring) (holding in part that the Clean Air
Act’s delegation of authority to the Environmental Protection Agency to set levels for national
ambient air quality standards was not a violation of the nondelegation doctrine).
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delegation jurisprudence has strayed too far from our Founders’
understanding of separation of powers.65

2. Nondelegation Analysis Should Be Applied to Appropriations Law
Some scholars contend that the nondelegation doctrine does not apply to
spending laws.66 They argue that Congress is not prohibited from allowing
agencies and the executive branch to decide how to spend some of their
appropriation.67 They further argue that the “nondelegation doctrine does not
require that Congress pass detailed appropriations each year when it passes the
budget, a requirement that would have imposed an extremely burdensome task
on the Congress and might have led to the abandonment of the traditional
practice of passing annual appropriations.”68 It is true that the language of the
Constitution is broad and does not direct how narrowly and specifically
appropriations must be written.69 Should Congress elect to provide larger, lump
sum appropriations that lack today’s specificity and instead give the executive
branch and its agencies the ability and discretion to spend funds as they see fit,
there would be no constitutional question or nondelegation doctrine issue.70
That is not the question posed by this Comment, however. The question here is
whether, after Congress specifically directs how funds are to be spent, a transfer
of funds away from a specific account and into another account poses a
nondelegation doctrine question in that it enables the executive branch direct use
of the legislative branch’s Article I, Section 9 spending power.
In Cincinnati Soap Co. v. United States, the Court rejected the idea that
Congress violated the nondelegation doctrine when it decided to pay the
Treasury of the Philippines, a U.S. territory at the time, tax revenues collected
from the Philippines and then allow the Philippines government to expend the
funds as they saw fit.71 Here again, the issue addressed was whether Congress
needed to specify how funds should be spent, not whether, in the absence of
specification, the executive branch was authorized to make its own
determination and transfer funds as it saw fit.72 There appears to be no case law
65. Id. at 487 (Thomas, J., concurring).
66. Michael B. Rappaport, The Selective Nondelegation Doctrine and the Line Item Veto: A
New Approach to the Nondelegation Doctrine and Its Implications for Clinton v. City of New York,
76 TUL. L. REV. 265, 273 (2001).
67. Id. at 272.
68. Id.
69. See generally U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7.
70. In the absence of specific direction, funds can still only be spent on programs and purposes
that have previously been authorized in other bills and which are still subject to the nondelegation
doctrine analysis. Rappaport, supra note 67, at 319.
71. Cincinnati Soap Co. v. United States, 301 U.S. 308, 321–22 (1937) (holding in part that
a tax on coconut oil was not invalid simply because the funds were then given to the Philippines
without a clear purpose, because Congress did appropriate the funds for the Philippines to use with
limited conditions).
72. Id. at 322–23.
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that has specifically challenged the constitutionality of transfers between
appropriations.
While a number of the transfer authority provisions included in the fiscal year
2017 omnibus (the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2017) place restrictions
on the amounts that may be transferred, in reality, there is very little restriction
on the accounts to or from which appropriations may be transferred.73 Further,
transfer authority could enable the executive branch to transfer money after
enactment to projects for which the current Congress specifically could not reach
consensus, and in doing so, transfer funds away from projects upon which
Congress could and did reach consensus. The current debate on U.S. border
security74 serves as an example of this theory. Hypothetically, the Secretary of
Homeland Security could siphon off funds from a variety of other appropriations
to provide funding for controversial projects, such as the southwest border wall,
that Congress lacked consensus to fund at the additional enhanced level. If the
Department of Homeland Security operated under a lump sum appropriation, the
Department could easily make its own assessments of how to spend its annual
appropriation.75 But, in an era of multiple accounts and specific appropriations,
such a transfer would deny Congress as a body and, in many cases, individual
members whose original vote may have depended on specific funding levels, the
ability to have the same influence on a process that circumvents Article I,
Section 9. Further, it would deny American taxpayers the protections inherent
in the process of Congress’ consideration of spending requests, development of
legislation, and debate on the floors of both chambers of Congress. 76

73. See, e.g., Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2017, Division A § 717, Division F § 503,
Division J § 7009(2).
74. Jacob Soboroff & Adam Edelman, See All 8 Prototypes for Trump’s ‘Big, Beautiful’
Border
Wall, NBC
NEWS
(Oct.
23,
2017,
3:32
PM),
https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/immigration/see-all-8-prototypes-trump-s-big-beautifulborder-wall-n813346 (explaining an ongoing debate regarding how a border wall between the U.S.
and Mexico will be paid for when the entire project could run upwards of $21 billion to complete,
with U.S. President Donald Trump requesting an initial $1.8 billion for fiscal year 2018).
75. See STAFF OF H.R. COMM. ON APPROPRIATIONS, 111TH CONG., supra note 25, at 9–10.
76. See SATURNO, HENIFF & LYNCH, supra note 27, at 3–4.
The annual appropriations cycle is initiated with the President’s budget submission,
which is due on the first Monday in February. This is followed by congressional
consideration of a budget resolution that, in part, sets spending ceilings for the upcoming
fiscal year. The target date for completion of the budget resolution is April 15.
Committee and floor consideration of the annual appropriations bills occurs during the
spring and summer months and may continue through the fall and winter until annual
appropriations are enacted. Floor consideration of appropriations measures is subject to
procedural rules that may limit the content of those measures and any amendments
thereto.
Id. at summary page.
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A. Further Roadblocks: The Legislative Veto

Congress has a history of seeking ways to maintain control of executive
decisions on policy implementation even after relevant legislation has been
passed.77 To avoid potential nondelegation doctrine issues associated with
transfers in violation of Article I, Section 9, an obvious solution would be for
Congress to allow transfers only with the approval of the committees of
jurisdiction. The Appropriations Committees already attempt to require some
agencies to obtain the committee’s approval prior to transferring funds. 78 Such
language would seem to assist in avoiding a question of delegation, because no
delegation can occur if Congress remains a custodian of such transfers by
requiring prior approval. But in reality, these solutions also run afoul of the
Constitution because they represent an unconstitutional legislative veto.
At the time of Chadha, 295 congressional veto provisions existed in 196
statutes.79 The practice continues today.80 The Chadha analysis has been
applied to appropriations language as well.81 Thus, any attempt to avoid a
nondelegation doctrine challenge while still providing some level of
congressional control by requiring prior committee approval for a transfer would
violate the holding in Chadha by denying the President the power of
presentment. While agencies may still seek approval as a matter of custom,

77. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 801 (2012) (codifying the Congressional Review Act, which gives
Congress the ability to review and overrule new regulations promulgated by executive branch
agencies if Congress passes a joint resolution).
78. Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2017, Division A § 717(b).
None of the funds provided by this Act, . . . shall be available for [transfer] . . . unless the
Secretary of Agriculture or the Secretary of Health and Human Services (as the case may
be) notifies in writing and receives approval from the Committees on Appropriations of
both Houses of Congress at least 30 days in advance of the . . . transfer of such funds or
the use of such authority.
Id.
79. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 at 944.
80. LOUIS FISHER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS22132, LEGISLATIVE VETOES AFTER
CHADHA, 5–6 (2005), http://www.loufisher.org/docs/lv/4116.pdf.
Congress continues to add legislative vetoes to bills and Presidents continue to sign them
into law, although often in their signing statements they object to these legislative vetoes
and regard them as unconstitutional under the Supreme Court’s ruling . . . . Although
Presidents have treated committee vetoes after Chadha as having no legally binding
value, agencies often adopt a different attitude. They have to work closely with their
review committees, year after year, and have a much greater need to devise practical
accommodations and honor them.
Id. (emphasis in original).
81. Id. at 4 (explaining that if spending caps are placed within the report language rather than
the actual statute, agencies such as NASA, that seek to move money around contrary to the
guidelines in the report language, have not created a statutory violation).
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deference, or fear of retribution, they could credibly make the argument that they
are not required by law to obtain such approval.82
B. Standing: Challenging a Transfer

As articulated above, transfer authority is likely unconstitutional. Bringing a
case before the courts to actually challenge the constitutionality of transfer
authority, however, would require a specific plaintiff to have a specific claim. 83
In order to establish standing, an individual or entity would need to demonstrate
a real, concrete, and particularized injury, rather than some abstract harm. 84
Plaintiffs in the context of the question contemplated by this Comment would
need to show that the transfer of funds from one account to another directly
caused them harm and that such harm constitutes more than an abstract,
theoretical injury.85 As such, plaintiffs would likely need to prove that they have
been harmed by an activity to which appropriations were transferred or that they
would have been a direct recipient or beneficiary of funds had those funds not
been transferred to another appropriation.
1. Finding a plaintiff absent congressional earmarks is challenging.

Finding a plaintiff who could argue credibly that he or she would be the direct
recipient of a specific appropriations poses a challenge in the modern era.
Historically, congressionally-directed spending, or earmarks, occurred when
funds were designated for a specific purpose and often a specific recipient. 86
Earmarking traditionally meant that individual members of Congress could
ensure that specific funds went to specific projects by including language that
directed certain funds to go directly to activities like research at home state
universities or for the construction of specific roads within specific
jurisdictions.87 Efforts to reign in “pork barrel” spending, however, have led to
self-imposed earmark bans.88 Before their demise, earmarks provided some
level of transparency, because Congress and the public could see who requested
82. Id. at 3. But “[o]ne effect of Chadha has been to drive some legislative vetoes
underground, where they operate on the basis of informal and nonstatutory understandings” as
demonstrated by Reagan’s objections in 1984 to language that he deemed a committee-veto clause
that violated Chadha. Id.
83. FED. R. CIV. P. 17(a) (stating that a “real party in interest” is required to sue or be sued).
84. Crawford v. U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, 868 F.3d 438, 453, 458 (6th Cir. 2017) (holding
plaintiffs challenging the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act and Bank Secrecy Act lacked
standing to bring such a claim).
85. Id. at 460–61.
86. See GAO GLOSSARY, supra note 3, at 44–45.
87. Rollcall Staff, supra note 16.
88. Stephen Dinan, Senate Votes to Keep Ban on Earmark Spending, WASH. TIMES (Jan. 10,
2017),
https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2017/jan/10/senate-votes-keep-ban-earmarkspending/. The Senate Republican conference voted again in 2017 to extend the GOP’s ban on
earmark spending, a decision that had already been in place for six years. Id.
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an earmark, for how much, and to whom those funds were directed. 89 Without
earmarks, determining who might be the actual recipient of funding when a bill
is enacted is more difficult because the decision-making lies with the “federal
agency bureaucrats.”90
2. Congressional parties might be able to gain standing.

If it is difficult to determine a party who would have otherwise received funds
that were transferred, then the question turns to who else might have standing to
bring a case challenging the constitutionality of a transfer. At various times,
members of Congress have turned to the courts to assert what they believe to be
their constitutional rights as members of the legislative branch.91 Such was the
case in Raines v. Byrd, in which individual members of Congress challenged the
constitutionality of the President’s line item veto authority. 92 But the Court
refused to find they had standing on the basis that, “the institutional injury they
allege[d] [was] wholly abstract and widely dispersed . . . , and their attempt to
litigate the dispute at [that] time and in [that] form [was] contrary to historical
experience.”93
The Court may be more inclined to find that members of Congress have
standing when they bring an action on behalf of an entire chamber, as was the
case in United States House of Representatives v. Burwell.94 There, the House
argued, in part, that the Secretary of the Treasury and the Secretary of Health
and Human Services used federal funds that had not been appropriated to
implement the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, in violation of Article
89. Rollcall Staff, supra note 16. The lack of earmarks actually may have made appropriating
and “passing legislation through both chambers, already a herculean task in a Washington mired in
partisan gridlock, a virtual impossibility.” Id.
90. Id.; see also Eric Pierce, Congress Keeps Ceding Power to the President, THE DOWNEY
PATRIOT (Dec. 23, 2010), https://www.thedowneypatriot.com/articles/congress-keeps-cedingpower-to-the-president?rq=congress%20keeps%20ceding%20power%20to%20the%20president
(arguing that while Congress should seek transparency, it should also keep earmarks and require
an up or down vote on each, rather than outright eliminate the earmark, which would instead limit
congressional power).
91. See generally Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 829–30 (1997) (holding that individual
members of Congress may not have standing as individuals to advocate for the rights of the
legislative branch as a whole).
92. Id. at 816.
93. Id. at 829.
[The Court] attach[ed] some importance to the fact that appellees have not been
authorized to represent their respective Houses of Congress in this action, and indeed
both Houses actively oppose their suit. We also note that our conclusion neither deprives
Members of Congress of an adequate remedy (since they may repeal the Act or exempt
appropriations bills from its reach), nor forecloses the Act from constitutional challenge
(by someone who suffers judicially cognizable injury as a result of the Act).
Id. (internal citations omitted).
94. U.S. House of Reps. v. Burwell, 130 F. Supp. 3d 53, 57–58 (D.D.C. 2015).
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I, Section 9.95 The Secretaries argued that the House of Representatives did not
have standing to bring such a case, but the “House oppose[d], adamant that it
ha[d] been injured in several concrete ways, none of which can be ameliorated
through the usual political processes.”96 On the question of whether the House
could sue the Secretaries, the court agreed that the House had standing, because
the “House sue[d], as an institutional plaintiff, to preserve its power of the purse
and to maintain constitutional equilibrium between the Executive and the
Legislative. If its non-appropriation claims have merit, . . . the House has been
injured in a concrete and particular way that is . . . remediable in court.”97
Based on House v. Burwell, entire chambers of Congress appear to be able to
obtain standing more readily.98 Because of the challenges a non-congressional
entity would find in attempting to establish standing, the Houses of Congress are
among the few entities that might be able to bring a claim successfully against
the constitutionality of transfer authority. It seems unlikely that a chamber
would pursue such action, however, when instead, it could simply seek to
eliminate or modify the transfer authority included in the annual appropriations
bills it helps develop and enact.
Because it is likely that only a few individual litigants are capable of
challenging transfer authority, any future action to moderate transfer authority
would likely be a political action rather than a response to a judicial decision.
IV. RESOLVING THE NONDELEGATION DOCTRINE AND TRANSFER AUTHORITY
CONUNDRUM
A. Returning to Lump Sum Appropriations

One possible solution to avoid constitutional issues associated with transfer
authority, the nondelegation doctrine, and Chadha’s holding on the legislative
veto, would be for appropriations bills to return to a broader form, including
higher-level, lump sum appropriations.99 Doing so could provide the executive
branch agencies with more flexibility to make assessments throughout the year
and fund activities based on an agency’s changing needs, rather than adhere to a
more specific, prearranged spending plan.
Such a solution can be illustrated by the following hypothetical.100 Assume
that a department is funded through three separate appropriations: (1) a salaries
95. Id. at 57.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 57–58.
98. See id. at 81.
99. “[T]he very point of a lump-sum appropriation is to give an agency the capacity to adapt
to changing circumstances and meet its statutory responsibilities in what it sees as the most effective
and desirable way.” Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U.S. 182, 192 (1993).
100. As an actual real-life occurrence,
the then Department of Health, Education, and Welfare received a lump-sum
appropriation covering several grant programs, it could set aside a portion of each
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account, (2) a procurement account, and (3) a research account. Each account
is funded at $3 billion, for a total of $9 billion. In light of the likely
unconstitutionality of transfer authority, if the department experiences a major
cybersecurity attack that requires additional funding, the department decides that
it should procure immediately new information technology systems through its
procurement account and pay for it by deferring some low priority research
projects, the agency would be limited from using funds from the research
account to supplement the procurement account absent new appropriations made
by law even if Congress and the agency both agree that doing so would be
prudent.
In this hypothetical, however, if the entire department was funded at $9 billion
through one single account, the department could make its own assessments
about how to address most prudently the cybersecurity challenge without
running afoul of constitutional issues. It could elect to amend its own internal
spending plans with greater efficiency without the need to involve Congress at
all.
While this solution may address the constitutional issues posed by the
nondelegation doctrine and legislative veto, it cedes congressional power to the
executive branch by placing greater discretion in the hands of the unelected
employees of the department. While this solution adheres more faithfully than
current practice to the letter of the Constitution’s legislative power over
spending,101 it arguably abdicates more authority to the growing bureaucratic
state that “may or may not be familiar with the communities they’re affecting,”
and therefore perhaps would offend Jefferson’s sensibilities by eroding the
Constitution’s intent that the power of the purse belongs with Congress.102
Instead of lump sum appropriations, Congress should move to change the rules
of debate surrounding appropriations bills.
B. Creating Expedited Rules of Debate

Rather than resolving the Constitutional issues discussed above by
minimizing congressional power with lump sum appropriations, Congress
should act to strengthen that power by incentivizing the timely consideration and
passage of appropriations bills. One of the difficulties in passing any piece of
legislation, appropriations bills included, lies in the speed with which Congress
can move to address issues that arise. Congress, specifically the Senate, is
program’s allocation for a single fund to be used for “cross-cutting” grants intended to
serve more than one target population, as long as the grants were for projects within the
scope or purpose of the lump-sum appropriation.
GAO LEGAL FRAMEWORK, supra note 38, at 2–39.
101. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7.
102. Pierce, supra note 93; see also Sarah Binder, Power of the Purse in Peril?, WASH. POST
(Sept. 19, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2014/09/19/power-ofthe-purse-in-peril/?utm_term=.8eb52ff9c85e (reporting that lawmakers “pay a price” when they
give up spending power to bureaucrats).
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designed to move very deliberatively absent unanimous consent, where every
member agrees to set aside procedural roadblocks.103 When an agency
experiences an exigent or unexpected budgetary circumstance in the middle of
a fiscal year, rather than employ transfer authority schemes, Congress should be
more readily able to enact new appropriations bills to specifically address the
changed circumstance.
Under the current model and procedure for debate of such bills, doing so
would be arduous, and the lack of time on the legislative calendar would simply
prevent the consideration of numerous new appropriations bills throughout the
year. But, if the speed with which the committees and both chambers could
address emerging needs throughout the year were expedited, then Congress
could revise the funds available for specific projects on an as needed basis, all
the while avoiding problematic transfers.
Currently, in the Senate alone, floor debate is “governed by a set of standing
rules, a body of precedents created by rulings of presiding officers or by votes
of the Senate, a variety of established and customary practices, and ad hoc
arrangements the Senate makes to meet specific parliamentary and political
circumstances.”104 Further, the length of debate in the Senate is open ended by
design, with almost no limit on the number of Senators that may speak on an
issue or for how long they may speak.105 For example, “[w]hen Senators are
recognized by the presiding officer, the rules normally permit them to speak for
as long as they wish, and questions generally cannot be put to a vote as long as
there are Senators who still wish to make the speeches they are permitted to
make.”106 To invoke cloture107 in the Senate, or end debate on a matter on which
just one individual Senator seeks to continue, three-fifths of the Senate must vote
to do so, and even once cloture is invoked, 30 hours of debate must take place
before the matter can be resolved.108 Similarly, bills or joint resolutions relating
to congressionally directed spending must be available to members and the
general public for at least 48 hours before they can be voted on.109 This creates
a potentially lengthy process of approval.
103. U.S.
SENATE,
GLOSSARY,
Unanimous
Consent,
https://www.senate.gov/reference/glossary_term/unanimous_consent.htm (last visited Mar. 18,
2018).
104. VALERIE HEITSHUSEN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 96–548, THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS
ON
THE
SENATE
FLOOR:
AN
INTRODUCTION
1
(2017),
https://www.senate.gov/CRSpubs/5c970bdd-ed33-446c-a646-cda331d7b108.pdf.
105. Id. at 2.
106. Id.
107. Cloture is the closure of debate and requires the vote of 3/5 of the Senate. WATER J.
OLESZEK, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 98–780, CLOTURE: ITS EFFECT ON SENATE PROCEEDINGS 1
(2008), https://www.senate.gov/CRSpubs/271e65d0-6862-4e62-938c-8e65249ae391.pdf.
108. HEITSCHUSEN, supra note 107, at 3.
109. STANDING RULES OF THE SENATE, Rule 44, https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CDOC113sdoc18/pdf/CDOC-113sdoc18.pdf#page=20.
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All of these rules are, in fact, just the Senate’s own rules. The Constitution is
silent on how long or through what procedures Congress should consider
spending bills. Instead, the chambers, through the precedents and rules the
members themselves have created and modified over the years, dictate the speed
with which Congress can consider appropriations bills.110 As such, the members
of Congress should move to change their own rules to expedite and simplify
consideration of spending bills outside of the regular, annual appropriations
process.
The treatment of debate and the processes of considering executive branch
and judicial appointments in the Senate is a prime example of the Senate
changing its own rules to expedite debate.111 Prior to January 2013, it could take
up to a week for the Senate to consider a nomination.112 In January 2013,
however, then Majority Leader Harry Reid led an effort to expedite their
consideration by changing the Senate the precedent that requires three-fifths of
Senators to invoke cloture and then 30 hours of post-cloture debate, instead
enabling the Senate to call up a nomination, formally move to debate that
nomination four hours later, and then pass the nomination by a mere majority
vote.113
If the Senate, and Congress as a whole, can change its own procedures for
something as significant as such nominations, then it certainly should explore
the idea of changing the procedures for consideration of appropriations matters
that arise outside the regular annual appropriations process. Congress could set
guidelines for what types of appropriations modifications are eligible for this
expedited debate, perhaps even imposing the same monetary and other limits it
is already using in the context of transfer authority. Anything beyond those
limits would not be eligible for the expedited procedure, ensuring that major
spending changes still receive the requisite attention and debate currently
required. Expedited procedures would enable Congress to place its stamp of
approval or disapproval on updates to previously passed appropriations bills,
avoiding the Constitutional questions transfer authority invites.
V. CONCLUSION

Appropriations bills give life to trillions of dollars annually. Such sums
should not be disbursed lackadaisically on a whim or handed over to someone
110. HEITSCHUSEN, supra note 107 at 1–3, 5.
111. See Jonathan Weisman, New Senate Rules Designed to Speed Things Up, N.Y. TIMES
(Jan. 24, 2013, 4:59 PM), https://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/01/24/new-senate-rulesdesigned-to-speed-things-up/.
112. Id.
113. Id. The 115th Congress employed a similar “nuclear option” by changing the Senate rules
to change the number of votes required to confirm a Supreme Court nomination from 60 to a simple
majority. Matt Flegenheimer, Senate Republicans Deploy ‘Nuclear Option’ to Clear Path for
Gorsuch, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 6, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/06/us/politics/neilgorsuch-supreme-court-senate.html.
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else to handle. Yet that is exactly what Congress does every time it provides
executive branch agencies the authority to transfer funds between
appropriations. Congress, as the exclusive custodian of the power of the purse,
must not absolve itself of its Constitutional prerogative and obligation by giving
bureaucrats the ability to move money around as they see fit in contravention of
appropriations made by law. Doing so is a violation of the non-delegation
doctrine.
Congress has limited options to ameliorate this situation: if Congress tries to
prevent delegating away its appropriations authority by only allowing transfers
subject to the Appropriations Committees’ preapproval, Congress will violate
Chadha. Additionally, most plaintiffs challenging transfer authority will
struggle to gain standing.
Instead, the likelihood of addressing the
constitutionality of transfer authority will require Congress acting on its own to
reclaim its authority. Procedural rule changes to expedite Congress’ ability to
consider emerging appropriations mid-year, outside the regular, annual
appropriations process, would enable Congress to follow the letter and the spirit
of the Constitution.
Absent Congress taking the first move to confront its adherence to the
Constitution seriously, transfer authority will represent just one of many ways
Congress whittles away its authorities and threatens the separation of power that
our country is built upon.114

114. Some members of Congress stand ready to defend their Constitutional prerogatives. For
example, former Congressman Lee Hamilton stated:
I’ve never been able to figure out why Congress seems so interested in giving up power.
When you’re sworn in as a member on Capitol Hill, you take an oath to uphold the
Constitution, which places Congress first in the firmament of national governance and
makes it coequal to the presidency. Yet over the years, members of Congress have
repeatedly handed the executive branch more power, in everything from going to war to
budget-making to designing the specifics of financial-industry reform.
Pierce, supra note 93.
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